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ABSTRACT In the current business landscape, in which technology-enabled entrepreneurship is 
part of  the New Normal, regulatory institutional structures are in constant flux. Previous studies 
have framed the challenges facing entrepreneurs in mature organizational fields as avoiding the 
power of  overbearing regulators long enough to establish the legitimacy of  their ventures. In 
fields typified by New Normal conditions, however, regulatory frameworks for evaluating new 
technology-enabled ventures are often still lacking. Regulators may choose to actively reach out 
to entrepreneurs to arrive at a better understanding of  the radical technological changes and 
high-frequency entrepreneurial behavioural adaptations that occur in these settings. To grasp 
how novel regulatory institutional structures come about in the New Normal business land-
scape, we conducted a processual study of  the emergence of  a new technology that is the Dutch 
remotely piloted aircraft systems (drone) industry between 2000 and 2018. Our findings show 
that regulatory proto-institutions result from dialectic institutional work in the form of  structured 
interactions between entrepreneurs and regulators. Specifically, we present a process model that 
reveals how new regulatory structures evolve in contexts where high levels of  technological and 
behavioural change induce systemic uncertainty, and enlarge the interdependence between en-
trepreneurs and regulators. We suggest that our process theory of  proto-institutional emergence 
generalizes towards other organizational fields in which technology-enabled entrepreneurship 
has become the main driver of  growth. Theoretically, our findings speak to the literatures on 
institutional work, proto-institutional emergence, and the New Normal business landscape.
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INTRODUCTION
How do regulatory proto-institutions arise in the type of  technology-enabled and be-
havioural change-prone organizational fields that are emblematic for the New Normal 
business landscape? Prior research on institutional work has predominantly focused on 
the relationship between agency and structure, gleaning inspiration also from the liter-
ature on institutional entrepreneurship (Garud et al., 2002; Greenwood and Suddaby, 
2006; Maguire et al., 2004). Others have stressed that ‘institutional work insists on the 
need to consider the permanent recursive and dialectical interaction between agency 
and institutions’ (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 55), thus pointing to the interactive element of  
institutional work. However, a complete picture of  institutional emergence requires that 
we move beyond heroic accounts of  how institutional entrepreneurs struggle with fully 
entrenched institutions (Peng et al., 2017). Especially in the New Normal business land-
scape, in which technology-enabled entrepreneurship often is the norm (Hitt et al., 1998; 
Verbeke, 2018), our current theoretical understanding of  institutional change does not 
suffice for grasping how key stakeholder groups like entrepreneurs and regulators jointly 
contribute to proto-institutional emergence. In fact, Forbes and Kirsch’s (2011, p. 589) 
earlier claim that the study of  entrepreneurial activities in emerging industries ‘remains 
relatively neglected by researchers’ still rings true today.
We define the New Normal business landscape as an environmental condition in which 
new growth opportunities primarily stem from robust entrepreneurial activities that are 
enabled by technological innovation and new business models, and where responsiveness 
to these growth opportunities leads entrepreneurs to make major and sometimes frequent 
change to their behaviours (see Verbeke, 2018). In combination with the increasing financial 
and capacity constraints facing governments (Abels, 2014; Davis, 2009), the technological 
and behavioural volatility that is constitutive of  the New Normal furthermore necessitates 
regulators to actively seek entrepreneurs’ input in the regulatory process, and make it more 
co-creational (see Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2010; Lewin and Volberda, 1999). Under such 
conditions, the grip of  regulatory proto-institutions – novel normative and regulatory pre-
scriptions that are not yet fully legitimated and diffused (Lawrence et al., 2002; Zietsma 
and McKnight, 2009) – on entrepreneurial behaviour is looser than it might otherwise be 
in more mature fields. Because regulators cannot fully oversee the new realities that emerge 
from entrepreneurial activities in such contexts, and yet are eager to facilitate initiatives that 
hold the promise of  economic development, entrepreneurs are given considerable leeway 
to participate in the creation of  regulatory proto-institutions. Entrepreneurial behaviour 
hereby becomes an important source of  industry regulation in itself, in that the regulatory 
proto-institutional prescriptions entrepreneurs face have sprung, at least in part, from their 
own interactions with regulators. At present, however, we lack theory explaining how entre-
preneur–regulator interactions lead to regulatory proto-institutional emergence. Our aim 
is to develop a process-theoretical account of  these dialectic interaction patterns between 
entrepreneurs and regulators, based on multiple complementary sources of  longitudi-
nal qualitative data (Faems and Filatotchev, 2018). We document the micro-momentary 
actions through which entrepreneurs shape their own regulatory contexts in interaction 
with regulators. These actions have a profound conditioning effect on the opportunity and 
constraint structures facing later generation entrepreneurs.
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Our study is set in an organizational field that is representative of  the New Normal 
business landscape: the Dutch industry for businesses that produce, commercially oper-
ate, and/or deliver services for remotely-piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), colloquially re-
ferred to as drones. We rely on several sources of  longitudinal qualitative data, including 
participation in industry events, analysis of  archival data, field notes, and personal obser-
vations, as well as 27 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with industry participants. Our 
analyses show how the regulatory proto-institutions in this field have emerged in four 
consecutive evolutionary phases. Proto-institutional structures emerge in each phase as 
a joint entrepreneurial and regulatory response to challenges and opportunities experi-
enced in prior phases. At the same time, new structures also give rise to institutional fric-
tions,1  which continue to mount until they cause an institutional transition that sounds in 
a next evolutionary phase (Padgett and Powell, 2012; Schneiberg, 2006). Our results thus 
have a strong processual character, in that entrepreneur–regulator interactions occur in 
different phases of  the proto-institutional emergence process, and play a central role in 
moving the emergence process along from one phase to the next.
Our study makes several theoretical, empirical, and practical contributions. First, by in-
troducing the concept of  dialectic institutional work, we go beyond the commonly researched 
interplay between agency and structure to illustrate how diverse entrepreneur–regulator 
interactions in the New Normal business landscape contribute to proto-institutional 
emergence. We specifically build on Lawrence and colleagues (2011, p. 56), who state 
‘[e]xamining institutional work in the context of  emergent institutional processes points 
to the actions of  those who affect, or attempt to affect, institutional processes at both the 
general and the local levels’. Following these authors’ advice, we apply the institutional 
work lens to analysing the emergence of  proto-institutions in a New Normal setting. This 
is in line with work by Ozcan and Gurses (2018, p. 1811), who point to the need ‘to con-
sider the various contradictory and complementary institutional work done by the dif-
ferent actors involved in institutional processes (Delbridge and Edwards, 2008)’. Second, 
by translating our findings into a clear framework, we show how entrepreneurs and reg-
ulators create new proto-institutions in the New Normal business landscape. Specifically, 
we contribute to the literature on institutional emergence (Padgett and Powell, 2012) by 
documenting a process through which proto-institutions can evolve. In doing so, we re-
spond to a call by McMullen and Dimov (2013) for more process-oriented approaches in 
entrepreneurship studies and to the ‘need for more studies to clarify how scholars, man-
agers and policymakers can better understand and interact with emerging industries’ 
(Forbes and Kirsch, 2011, p. 590).
In addition, this work advances our collective understanding of  the New Normal busi-
ness landscape by showing that under conditions of  radical technological change and 
frequent behavioural adaptations (Hitt et al., 1998; Verbeke, 2018), entrepreneurs and 
regulators face greater uncertainty and interdependence than in more mature organi-
zational fields. These parties are especially interdependent in the New Normal business 
landscape because growth from existing businesses has stagnated in many fields, which 
gives centre stage to high-growth entrepreneurial ventures; public pressure on govern-
ments to regulate newly emerging fields is on the increase; and financial and capacity 
constraints facing federal and local governments (including the state level in the USA 
and the member state level in the European Union) necessitate regulatory co-creation 
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(Abels, 2014; Benton, 2013; Davis, 2009; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; El-Erian, 2010; 
Martin et al., 2012). The New Normal business landscape is thus in need of  theory on 
how entrepreneurs and regulators jointly co-create new regulatory frameworks. We argue 
and show that dialectic institutional work is a dominant form of  policymaking in the New 
Normal business landscape, and that the resultant process of  proto-institutional emer-
gence might also be found in other nascent fields characterized by technology-enabled 
entrepreneurship, including blockchain-based fintech companies, platform-based shar-
ing economy firms, and decentralized renewable energy generation. In all these cases, 
entrepreneurship around sustaining or disruptive innovations are likely to engender reg-
ulatory institutional change (Ahlstrom et al., 2018; Kumaraswamy et al., 2018).
LITERATURE REVIEW
Entrepreneurs face uncertainty regarding the future of  their ventures, not only due to 
the uncertain nature of  the business itself, but also because of  fast change in the business 
environment (Ahlstrom and Ding, 2014; Ozcan and Gurses, 2018). This is especially 
true in the New Normal business landscape, in which institutionally determined op-
portunity and constraint structures are still in flux. Whereas it used to take decades for 
industries to mature, following a predictable pattern of  industry evolution (Aldrich and 
Ruef, 2006; Klepper and Graddy, 1990), institutional emergence is currently more rapid 
and less predictable due to the impact of  radical technological change and frequent be-
havioural adaptations of  involved stakeholders (Verbeke, 2018). We therefore need new 
frameworks to help us understand how regulatory proto-institutional structures emerge 
in these novel contexts (Young et al., 2014). The literatures on institutional work and 
proto-institutions and their emergence offer excellent points of  departure for developing 
these new frameworks.
Institutional Work
Institutional work describes the ‘purposeful action of  individuals and organizations aimed 
at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions’. Scholars in this area have mostly 
been concerned with ‘understanding the role of  actors in effecting, transforming and 
maintaining institutions and fields’ (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006, p. 215). Institutional 
work activities have previously been documented in the literatures on institutional entre-
preneurship, institutional change, and deinstitutionalization (Lawrence et al., 2009). In 
theorizing the process of  institutional creation, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, p. 221) 
distinguish between three sets of  practices. These start with ‘overtly political work in 
which actors reconstruct rules, property rights and boundaries that define access to ma-
terial resources’, which they refer to as vesting, defining, and advocacy work. The authors 
then point to work directed at changing norms as well as constructing identities and net-
works ‘in which actors’ belief  systems are reconfigured’. Lastly, actions aimed at mimicry, 
theorizing, and educating involve ‘abstract categorizations in which the boundaries of  
meaning systems are altered’.
The focus in institutional work lies on actions taken by actors in relation to institu-
tions (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Oliver, 1991). Whereas earlier studies in the 
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neo-institutional tradition tended to focus on the impact of  institutionalized norms on 
organizational structures, recent research puts more emphasis on agency – up to the 
extent that entrepreneurs are portrayed ‘as powerful, heroic figures able to drastically 
shape institutions’ (Lawrence et al., 2009, p. 3). Indeed, institutional entrepreneurship 
can be seen as one stream of  research within the institutional work framework (Lawrence 
and Suddaby, 2006, p. 216). However, it has also been argued that the creation of  new 
institutions requires more resources and mobilizing power than what can be mustered 
by even the most heroic of  institutional entrepreneurs; the institutional work needed to 
create new institutions inevitably has to draw on a broader collective of  actors. These are 
not only institutional entrepreneurs, but also actors ‘whose role is supportive or facilita-
tive of  the entrepreneur’s endeavours’ (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006, p. 217; Leblebici 
et al., 1991).
While the institutional entrepreneurship literature generally focuses on the entrepre-
neur as the most important actor in creating new ventures, markets, and organizational 
fields, the relationships between entrepreneurs and other stakeholders should not be dis-
regarded. Lawrence et al. (2011, p. 54) stress that Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 43) al-
ready pointed out that the creation of  new institutions is ‘arising directly from reciprocal 
typifications that occur in the habitual interaction of  individuals’. Consideration of  these 
interactions and relationships is crucial for understanding the institutional work pro-
cesses leading to proto-institutional emergence. In the New Normal business landscape 
in particular, in which technology-enabled entrepreneurship is rampant and constantly 
invokes behavioural change, new opportunity and constraint structures emerge out of  
the recursive interactions and relationships between entrepreneurs and regulators, with 
neither party being clearly in the lead of  this process.
Proto-Institutions
Proto-institutions are ‘institutions in the making’ (Lawrence et al., 2002, p. 283). They 
consist of  practices, rules, and technologies that are not yet fully established, but have 
the potential to become conventional institutions once they are accepted and diffused 
throughout a field. Thus, they form ‘a particular set of  institutional arrangements as a 
solution to some problem’ (Zietsma and McKnight, 2009, p. 148), where this ‘problem’ 
often arises from novel practices, rules, and technologies that have no standardized or 
institutionalized way to be dealt with. Unsurprisingly, proto-institutions are more likely 
to be found in emergent fields and in the New Normal business landscape (Maguire 
et al., 2004).2 
Research on proto-institutions focuses on collaboration, co-creation, and partnerships 
to explain the processes shaping the emergence of  future institutions. In their study of  
an NGO in Palestine, Lawrence and colleagues (2002) zoom in on interorganizational 
collaborations to explain the emergence of  proto-institutions, while Boxenbaum (2004) 
classifies the emergence of  diversity management in the Danish context as a proto- 
institution. Zietsma and McKnight (2009) study the Canadian coastal forest industry and 
identify the co-creation processes that occur when proto-institutions form. Webb et al. 
(2010) conceptualize proto-institutions as network-level influences that help multinational 
enterprises overcome institutional-level obstacles. Helfen and Sydow (2013, p. 1079) define 
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proto-institutions as ‘the institutional outcomes of  negotiation work’ (emphasis in original), 
and Hensel (2018, p. 225) investigated organizational responses to proto-institutions in 
an effort to show ‘how clashes of  semi-edited and unedited accounts about the proto-in-
stitution affected its adoption and implementation’. With a slightly different focus, but 
related to proto-institutions, is the description of  Marti and Mair (2009, pp. 109–11) of  
provisional institutions. These are instrumentally built institutions that serve a temporary 
interest (here: poverty alleviation) for a certain period of  time. In comparison to proto-in-
stitutions, provisional institutions are created with the intention of  being a transitional 
means to an end. The proto-institutions that we explore go beyond temporary struc-
tures, however, in that they spring from mutual interaction patterns involving multiple 
stakeholder groups, whose intent it is to let these institutions acquire a more permanent 
character.
In sum, different actors are involved in shaping the New Normal business landscape by 
means of  their active participation in emerging technology-enabled and behaviourally 
fickle contexts. As new practices emerge and new rules form, regulatory proto- 
institutions are created as a pragmatic response to recurring problems in areas like public 
safety and privacy. Exploring the institutional work involved in creating these ‘candidates 
for institutionalization, if  only enough members of  the field will adopt them’ (Zietsma 
and McKnight, 2009, p. 148) in the context of  the New Normal is vital. Therefore, the 
research question that our study addresses is: How do regulatory proto-institutions arise in the 
type of  technology-enabled entrepreneurship-intensive and behavioural change-prone organizational fields 
that are emblematic for the New Normal business landscape?
METHODS
To address our research question, we relied on qualitative data from multiple sources, 
allowing us to build theory inductively on the basis of  continuous data analysis. We 
compared our ongoing analyses to new insights, while remaining open to new themes 
emerging directly from the data, thus following an iterative process of  data collection and 
analysis (Reay and Jones, 2016). We continued our data collection and analysis efforts 
until theoretical saturation was reached – the point at which no or few new insights could 
be generated by including more data. This is the best suited methodology for engaging 
with the under-researched theme of  proto-institutional emergence in the New Normal 
business landscape because we witnessed many ongoing developments as they took place. 
The processual nature of  our research question, asking the ‘how’ type of  question, al-
lowed us to generate the type of  deep insights that only qualitative data are able to pro-
vide (Barley, 1990; Langley, 1999).
Research Context: The Dutch RPAS Industry
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines RPAS as a ‘set of  config-
urable elements consisting of  a remotely-piloted aircraft, its associated remote pilot sta-
tion(s), the required command and control links and any other system elements as may be 
required, at any point during flight operation’ (International Civil Aviation Organization, 
2011, p. 12).3  Initially, RPAS were developed for military purposes, with the first ‘drones’ 
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being launched during World War I (Austin, 2011). However, conceptions of  flying ma-
chines date back to about 2500 years ago, when engineers in ancient Greece were inter-
ested in building mechanical birds or when, in China, a wooden hawk was developed 
(Dalamagkidis et al., 2012). Modern RPAS have been used in military conflicts and war 
zones. They have been used in Afghanistan since 2001, for example, for carrying out 
targeted kill missions (Gregory, 2011; McBride, 2009). Only recently have RPAS begun 
to be used for civil purposes (Braun et al., 2015). The Dutch commercial RPAS industry 
emerged from the leisure-driven market for model airplanes. At the beginning of  the 
21st century, aircraft systems became more affordable and available to a broader public. 
This process was facilitated by the rise of  mass-market producers such as the Chinese DJI, 
with their flagship aircraft, a quadricopter called the ‘Phantom’ (The Economist, 2015).
The Dutch RPAS industry is an appealing setting in which to study the emergence of  
proto-institutions for three reasons. First, entrepreneurial activity involving RPAS has 
increased in recent years and technology in this area continues to develop quickly. Flying 
a RPAS is not only seen as an entertaining leisure activity, but many companies have 
formed around them, either as operators, producers, or in related services for RPAS users 
(such as consultancy, online applications, or training). On the one hand, this offers a wide 
range of  opportunities for entrepreneurs. On the other, this development also has impli-
cations for other stakeholders, including policy makers and citizens whose physical safety 
and privacy may be at stake. Second, the global sales of  commercial RPAS are estimated 
to yield 4.8 billion USD in 2021, a remarkable increase from 608 million USD in 2014 
(WinterGreen Research, 2015). In Europe alone, the industry is expected to generate 
10 billion EUR annually by 2035 and over 15 billion EUR by 2050 (SESAR, 2016). This 
illustrates the economic relevance of  our research setting. Third, the field is in its forma-
tion phase and many developments – be they technological or regulatory – are still un-
folding. Efforts have been made to draw up regulatory instruction guides along the way, 
such as a roadmap issued by the European RPAS Steering Group in 2013 and a ‘proto-
type’ regulation document put forward by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 
in 2016. However, only in 2018, EASA was granted EU-wide rule-making competency 
for all civil drones.4  In spite of  these efforts, the implementation of  these frameworks still 
lies in the future, and harmonized rules for international airspace (similarly to manned 
aviation) remain years away. As such, an established institutional framework is not yet in 
place and development in this industry is still ongoing.
Data Collection
Our study includes data derived from active participation in the field, archival data 
and interviews. This is in line with what Gioia et al. (2013, p. 19) regard as ‘good 
qualitative research’; namely, drawing from several qualitative sources with an em-
phasis on field observation and archival data while at ‘the heart of  these studies is the 
semi-structured interview’. We conducted our interviews and field research between 
February 2015 and June 2017 and performed archival research between February 
2015 and October 2018. Our geographical focus is on the Netherlands, but we also 
took Europe-wide and even worldwide developments into consideration in order to 
draw the bigger picture.
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Fieldwork. We attended six major industry conferences (Hardy and Maguire, 2010; 
Lampel and Meyer, 2008): one held by the American RPAS industry association with 
a focus on European developments (Unmanned Systems Europe), two held by the 
European RPAS industry associations (RPAS CivOps and RPAS Civil Policy), one 
European business-to-business conference (SkyTech), one European logistics conference 
(Unmanned Cargo Aircraft Conference) and one Dutch logistics conference (Airneth). 
We also attended meetings held by the Dutch RPAS industry association (DARPAS), 
as well as a public parliament meeting at the Dutch House of  Representatives. Notes 
were taken during or after these meetings to supplement the more personal accounts 
of  the interviewed informants. We sought ethnographic immersion in the field, using 
field notes to capture our experiences. Forbes and Kirsch (2011) stress that this ‘real-
time’ approach is particularly well suited to studying the emergence of  a new field. We 
spent about 75 hours at these conferences, workshops, and meetings. Most interviews 
conducted with entrepreneurs were combined with a visit to the entrepreneurs’ firms, 
to get an impression of  their work environment. Products were shown by and informal 
conversations were held with the interviewees, as well as with other employees. We spent 
approximately 15 hours at those entrepreneurs’ firms. Throughout the data collection 
period, we maintained our awareness of  the risk of  becoming too close to the data, as 
too much researcher involvement can lead to the blind adoption of  the point of  view of  
the study’s subjects. In an effort to avoid this, we followed Gioia and colleagues’ (2013) 
lead by having one author adopt an outsider perspective, that is, abstaining from being 
involved in actual fieldwork and critically reflecting on all accounts by playing the devil’s 
advocate.
Archival data. We also collected presentations given at industry gatherings. We collected 
3,593 slides making up 240 presentations given at industry conferences, workshops, and 
seminars. Two videos shown during these meetings were also included. Regulators and 
government representatives are often invited to engage in conversation with industry 
stakeholders, and these presentations are an important source of  information on the 
perspective of  regulators. For instance, new policy plans were communicated during 
these presentations and progress updates were given by governmental working groups. As 
presentations are widely used to communicate and exchange ideas, they are particularly 
well suited to be used in our analysis. Table I describes the archival data we collected and 
analysed.
Interviews. We conducted 27 semi-structured, in-depth interviews: 20 with Dutch 
entrepreneurs, four with representatives of  regulatory bodies,5  and 3 with other 
stakeholders (a commercial pilot working for a start-up RPAS manufacturer, the 
director of  geo-information at an aerial mapping company, and an employee of  an 
intergovernmental economic institution dealing with RPAS-related topics). We relied 
on a theoretical sampling approach. After being introduced by the chair of  the Dutch 
RPAS association, we approached several entrepreneurs for an interview. At the end of  
each interview, the interviewee was asked to refer us to other key players in the field, 
based on the categories and themes that emerged during the interview. By following 
up on our emerging theoretical ideas, we construed a sample that included various 
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businesses, producers, operators, and service providers, as well as entrepreneurs who had 
discontinued their venture. Table II contains a description of  our sample.
All interviews were conducted in Dutch, with the exception of  one interview held 
in English. We used open-ended questions, and probing was used to give interviewees 
the space to express deep thoughts and elaborate on answers. These interviews were 
conversational, but we did make use of  an interview protocol to ensure that certain key 
topics were covered in all conversation (see Appendix 1). As Gioia and colleagues (2013) 
suggest, all questions were focused on our research question but did not lead the respon-
dents in any particular direction. We started by asking entrepreneurs about the process 
of  starting their own business, how they approached their venturing endeavours, any 
challenges they might be facing (both in the Netherlands and abroad), and their views on 
future developments. Regulators were asked about their work practices related to RPAS, 
their interaction with entrepreneurs, as well as their views on the current situation, prob-
lems they face in their work, and future developments both domestically and EU-wide. 
Interviews with other informants were used to obtain an alternative perspective, and 
were treated as background information to understand multiple viewpoints on the issue 
at hand. These interviews largely followed the entrepreneurs’ interview protocol. Most 
interviews were conducted face-to-face (N = 20), and the remainder by telephone (N = 7). 
We translated the interview quotes used to illustrate our findings into English ourselves, 
but had the translation reviewed by an English native speaker conversant in Dutch. All 
interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. In a single case (Respondent 21), the 
recording device malfunctioned and an interview summary was written afterwards. On 
average, interviews lasted about 75 minutes. We obtained a total of  446 pages of  tran-
scripts (Arial, 11 pt., single line spacing) from almost 30 hours of  interviews.
Data Analysis
We adopted an interpretivist epistemology, consistent with the constructionist research 
stream, which posits that the social world is constructed through the actions of  individuals 
acting upon it (Charmaz, 2014). We employed a pattern-inducing technique to analyse our 
data, in which ‘researchers gather empirical textual data that range from interview to di-
rect observation and often include personal experience, […] cluster text segments in mean-
ingful categories that they believe reveal actor behaviours […and…] make sense out of  the 
grouped data’ (Reay and Jones, 2016, pp. 449–50). We analysed our data using NVivo 11. 
Archival data was first sorted into three categories – presentations by entrepreneurs, pre-
sentations by regulators, and presentations by other stakeholders – and were then analysed. 
Presentations by other stakeholders include those given by universities, lawyers, industry 
associations, test sites, training and certifying agencies, research institutions, and indus-
try consortia. Naturally, our own presentations were excluded from the analyses. During 
open coding, we stayed close to the participants’ vocabularies and sorted information into 
meaningful categories. Afterwards, we went through the codes and looked for connections 
between the direct information gathered from the first step in the analysis process. From 
this, broad themes emerged. Finally, we grouped themes together, which led to the overall 
constructs that are an important part of  our process model, the diverse entrepreneur– 
regulator interactions. Table III displays the codes, broader themes and overall constructs.
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Table II. Interview sample overview
Respondent Classification Firm Description Function
R1 Service provider (non-flying) Consultancy Self-employed
R2 Manufacturer Manufacturing Co-founder, CTO
R3 Service provider (non-flying) Consultancy, conference 
organization
Founder, CEO
R4 Service provider (non-flying) ICT solutions Self-employed
R5 Manufacturer Manufacturing CEO
R6 Manufacturer, operator R&D, manufacturing Co-founder, CEO
R7 Operator Inspection, search and 
rescue, mapping, remote 
sensing
Co-founder, marketing 
and sales director
R8 Operator (firm discontinued) Emergency response, law 
enforcement, security
Co-founder, COO
R9 Operator Bird pest control Co-founder
R10 Operator Energy generation Co-founder, director
R11 Operator (firm discontinued) Aerial mapping, remote 
sensing
Founder
R12 Operator Film and photography Co-founder, managing 
director
R13 Manufacturer Manufacturing Compliance officer
R14 Operator Inspection, security, map-
ping, aerial imagery
Co-founder
R15 Governmental institution Governmental institution Supervisory body
R16 Governmental institution Governmental institution Supervisory body
R17 Operator Film, inspection Founder
R18 Operator Geodata Director geoinformation
R19 Manufacturer, operator Medical supply, traffic 
management, 
IT solutions
Founder
R20 Manufacturer Manufacturing Co-founder
R21 Intergovernmental economic 
institution
Intergovernmental 
economic institution
Economist
R22 Operator Film and photography Self-employed
R23 Operator Film and photography Self-employed
R24 Governmental institution Governmental institution Rule-making body
R25 Governmental institution Governmental institution Rule-making body
R26 Operator Film and photography, 
service platform, 
inspection
Co-founder
R27 Operator Film and photography, 
service platform, 
inspection
Co-founder
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Table III. Data structure
Entrepreneurs’ Perception: Rules Apply/Are Followed
Regulatory Context as Enabling Regulatory Context as Constraining
Regulation as precursors of  
competitive advantage
Rules as conduit for good 
regulatory relations
Regulatory attempts 
lagging practice
Regulations are 
unnecessarily limiting
• Adherence to strict 
rules guarantees high 
quality operations 
(‘if  you can fly in 
NL, you can fly 
everywhere’)
• Knowledge of  rules 
in manned aviation 
helps to understand 
how the system 
works and why rules 
are important
• Difficult regulatory 
framework allows for 
specialisation, offer 
clear advantage
• Feeling of  ownership of  
rules, having a say in it
• To be taken seriously 
you need to play by the 
rules
• Government is partner, 
not enemy
• It is all about ‘poli-
tics’, unclear who 
decides and how
• Technology and 
market are ready 
and developed, 
only laws are not
• Regulators do 
not understand 
the needs of  
entrepreneurs
• Rules that apply to 
manned aviation 
are falsely trans-
lated to drones
• Too many restric-
tions as to what is 
allowed, too much 
uncertainty
• Long and exhaust-
ing process as rules 
change continuously, 
frustrating
• Better to go abroad, 
to other countries 
where more is 
allowed
Entrepreneurs’ Perception: Rules Do Not Apply/Are Not Followed
Disregarding Regulatory Context Exception in Regulatory Context
Regulation has no direct 
effect
Regulation is not 
adhered to
Regulation needs to be more 
nuanced
Regulations openly 
disregarded
• Rules do not directly 
affect service provider, 
can adjust to changes
• Consequences for 
unlawful behaviour 
are low/cheap
• Taking risks without 
considering or being 
aware of  conse-
quences, e.g., crash 
into big crowd
• ‘Forced’ into illegal 
behaviour (govern-
ment too slow, rules 
too difficult)
• Want to be re-
sponsible, but lack 
knowledge (‘they 
don’t know enough’)
• Rules currently do 
not cover different 
applications, user 
groups
• Procedures do not 
match reality, so one 
should not obey
• What is allowed for 
leisure users should 
also be allowed for 
commercial users
• Rules for manned 
aviation are falsely 
translated to drones
• Rules may not be 
followed, but this is 
also communicated to 
regulators
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We then turned to Langley and colleagues (e.g., Langley, 1999; Langley and Abdallah, 
2011; Langley et al., 2013) and followed their methodological recommendations for 
process research. We teased out re-occurring interactions between regulators and en-
trepreneurs, and questioned their underlying beliefs and behavioural motivations. To 
validate these findings, we presented them to a variety of  stakeholders at a conference 
where both entrepreneurs and regulators were present. Through discussion, we sought 
to understand whether the framework we saw emerging from the data matched the per-
ceived reality of  industry insiders. Our findings were positively received and confirmed. 
Regulators’ Response: Facilitating
Co-Creation through Rule Selection Co-Creation through Rule Refinement
Regulatory change stems from 
learning
Regulatory change based on 
external forces
Regulation as starting point 
for discussion
Regulation as inclusive as 
possible
• Learning and gaining 
experience is part of  
the process (‘flex-
ibility in the rules is 
essential’)
• ‘Reflect state of  the 
art: best practices 
based on best avail-
able evidence and 
analysis’
• When EU-wide 
regulations come 
into place, certain 
rules will need to be 
abandoned
• New regulation for 
mini-drones was im-
plemented to lower 
the threshold of  
operating according 
to rules
• Rules did not take 
producer/test sites 
into account, but 
will be adjusted to 
facilitate entrepre-
neurs’ needs
• It is easier for profes-
sional firms that 
are known for safe 
operations to ‘get 
things done’ their 
way
• ‘Need to obtain buy 
in from all involved 
parties’
• ‘One size does not fit 
all’
Regulators’ Response: Restricting
Compliance through Rule Reinforcement Compliance through Rule Proliferation
Regulation as given basis for 
operation
Regulation due to newness 
of  RPAS
Regulation disobeyed 
unintentionally
Regulation and monitoring 
increasing
• Rules apply to the ma-
jority of  cases, need to 
be followed
• ‘Operate within the 
bounds of  existing 
legislation’
• Basis for all rule-
making is aviation 
law and its prin-
ciples need to be 
reinforced
• RPAS will have to 
prove to be as safe 
as current manned 
vehicle operations
• Lack of  understand-
ing of  complex rules
• Lack of  awareness 
of  current rules
• Informing customer 
sufficiently so that il-
legal operator would 
not be chosen again
• ‘more specific rules’ 
for RPAS that weren’t 
needed in manned 
aviation before
• Pressing charges, 
increasing monitoring 
by police
Table III. Continued
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In the end, no comments were made that led to major changes of  the regulator–entre-
preneur interactions we found to be characteristic for our research setting. We also built 
a chronological timeline detailing more than 65 events and occurrences relating to the 
development of  the RPAS industry in the Netherlands, the EU, and worldwide. We then 
employed temporal bracketing to meaningfully categorize these events (Langley, 1999). 
We looked for time spans that were internally homogeneous and externally heteroge-
neous. This allowed us to differentiate between four distinct evolutionary phases, which 
were included in the model we build. Finally, we placed the entrepreneur–regulator in-
teractions we uncovered in the timeline of  events. This allowed us to go beyond a purely 
synchronic illustration of  interactions, which tends to ‘freeze time’ (Barley, 1990, p. 223), 
and rather present a fully diachronic analysis of  how regulator–entrepreneur interac-
tions shape and are part of  the process by which proto-institutions arise. As the resulting 
visual representation is rather stylized, we stress that in reality there is overlap between 
phases and interactions.
FINDINGS
Overall Process of  Proto-Institutional Emergence
The process by which regulatory proto-institutions in the Dutch RPAS industry emerge 
is best typified by cooperation between rule makers and entrepreneurs, rather than by a 
top-down approach in which regulators dictate the terms.6  A Dutch regulator proudly 
described the Dutch approach as one that is ‘flexible’ and built on ‘co-creation’ (presen-
tation at European Civil RPAS Policy, Regulatory and Innovation Forum in Brussels, 
2017). At the EU level as well, the rules proposed by EASA are seen as ‘tentative and […] 
presented to generate a debate’ as regulators ‘need feedback from industry now’ (presen-
tation at EASA Workshop on Drones in Cologne, 2016). The European Organisation for 
Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE), an organization that develops aviation industry 
standards, summarized the process as: ‘industry and regulator →working together’ (pre-
sentation at High Level Conference on Drones in Warsaw, 2016). A representative of  
EUROCONTROL, the European Organisation for the Safety of  Air Navigation, speaks 
of  a ‘[p]ragmatic European approach’ (presentation at AUVSI’s Unmanned Systems 
Europe in Brussels, 2015) when discussing current rule-making efforts. In a report on 
the safe use of  RPAS, the European Parliament issued a statement in which it ‘considers 
that the industry, regulators, and commercial operators must come together to guarantee 
legal certainty’ (European Commission, 2015). The need for a joint approach is thus 
recognized by a variety of  parties, both domestically and at the EU level.
Our evidence shows that Dutch rule makers are aware of  their knowledge gap, and 
actively approach industry stakeholders to find workable solutions. Rule makers had to 
rely on their ‘gut feeling’ in the past (Respondent 25). As the minister of  Infrastructure 
and Environment pointed out during a committee meeting, regulators may even need to 
make arbitrary decisions in order to elicit feedback from the entrepreneurs who will be 
subjected to the new regulations. She explained how the 4 kg weight limit was chosen for 
newly proposed regulations covering so-called ‘mini-drones’:
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I was wondering myself  why four kilograms was chosen and not, for example, one kilogram. You can 
see a variety of  weights in our neighboring countries, and there are hardly any rules for drones from 
one to seven kilograms. (...) Four kilos has been chosen as it is the middle of  one and seven kilograms, 
and was intended as a starting point for discussion with the drone industry. Consultations with the 
industry have shown that a limit of  one kilogram is acceptable for a drone where there are no demands 
of  the pilot and that does not require separate examination. (...) We want to make rules that allow for 
innovations. (Dutch House of  Representatives, 2015)
This quote illustrates the willingness of  regulators to involve the people that will ulti-
mately have to deal with the new regulations. Entrepreneurs welcomed this openness and 
were happy to contribute to shaping the nascent regulatory context. One respondent, 
an entrepreneur with many years of  industry experience who had started a number of  
firms, described this process as follows:
We are simply trying to create a commercial company which meets all the requirements of  the gov-
ernment and also cooperates. We're also working with them, we work very well together with the 
government, and I have been allowed to advise both the Dutch government and European authorities 
concerning regulations. Purely because we know what we are talking about. If  you’re sitting in a meet-
ing with relevant European stakeholders, then I'm the only one who actually flies [a drone] and knows 
what he’s talking about. (Respondent 11)
Regulators, of  course, have a different perspective on developments within the emerging 
industry than entrepreneurs do. Entrepreneurs not only have more extensive knowledge 
of  the market, but can also draw on different formative past experiences. An interac-
tive process thus enables rule makers, as well as entrepreneurs, to be freed from wrong-
ful assumptions about the status quo. This is illustrated by a conversation one of  the 
interviewed entrepreneurs had with an employee of  the Environment and Transport 
Inspectorate, an agency of  the Ministry of  Infrastructure and Environment:
Sometimes a person [at that agency] who sits behind his desk has very different ideas. I've had this 
conversation many times, [they say]: ‘You are a commercial operator, so you always go one step further’. 
I think that is very illogical. I put my business at stake, which means that I will never go as far as 
a hobbyist would. I am exercising much more caution. They had a very different perception. They 
thought that there is a commercial interest behind it, there is money to be earned, so you take more risks. 
(…) We do not operate a 1,500 Euro system, we use systems that cost 20,000 or 30,000 Euro, so 
you won’t take any risks, because again, that is a risk to your business. You don’t do that, while they 
[the agency] had a very different belief, which was quite striking. (Respondent 7)
Other advisory bodies, like the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking of  Unmanned Systems 
(JARUS), which includes representatives from 50 countries and contributes to the devel-
opment of  an RPAS regulatory framework for the safe integration of  RPAS into airspace, 
included a stakeholder team into their structure. They recognized ‘[p]artnership as the 
key to success’ and required ‘[b]road stakeholder involvement’. Thus, JARUS created a 
Stakeholder Consultation Body ensuring that industry stakeholders like manufacturers, 
industry associations, air navigation service providers, standardization bodies, operators 
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and pilots were involved (presentation at EASA Workshop on Drones in Cologne, 2016; 
RPAS CivOps in Brussels, 2016). The same goes for other EU agencies, as an EASA rep-
resentative stated that they were ‘committed to work in cooperation with all stakeholders’ 
(RPAS CivOps in Brussels, 2016). The Swiss Federal Office of  Civil Aviation even be-
lieved that ‘a smart regulator (…) is part of  the Drone Ecosystem [and] develops with the 
Ecosystem standard scenarios to reduce the authorisation effort and the administrative 
burden’ (presentation at EASA Workshop on Drones in Cologne, 2016). Thus, the inten-
tion to co-create the regulatory context is inherent in the RPAS industry.
While the regulatory process is Europe is collaborative in nature, this does not mean 
that it is easier or faster than regulatory processes elsewhere. Entrepreneurs who hope 
to move forward as quickly as possible still tend to experience the process as tiresome. 
Respondent 5, for example, stated that ‘the rule making, how it goes with these agencies, 
I find it really tiring, extremely slow’.
Having presented our insights into the process, we now turn to the different phases 
that characterize proto-institutional emergence in the Dutch RPAS industry and the dis-
tinct entrepreneur–regulator interactions that gave rise to proto-institutional emergence 
during the study period.
Phases of  Proto-Institutional Emergence Driven by Distinct 
Entrepreneur–Regulator Interactions
We distinguish between four phases of  proto-institutional emergence in the RPAS in-
dustry between 2000 and 2018. Each phase spans two to five years, and includes 7–28 
events.7  We observe several cascading effects (Verbeke, 2018) through which interna-
tional and EU-level developments influence Dutch regulatory developments and condi-
tion the activities of  actors within the Netherlands. The separate phases represent a way 
to map the process of  proto-institutional emergence in the New Normal business land-
scape. We illustrate which interactions between entrepreneurs and regulators give the 
impetus for proto-institutional emergence. We find that RPAS entrepreneurs share two 
fundamental beliefs about the nature of  the regulatory environment. They either recog-
nize the existence of  rules they need to adhere to, or they perceive the rules as extant, 
but not applicable to themselves. Between RPAS regulators, we find two different beliefs 
about how best to create the regulatory context. They either hold a facilitating view of  
what the new regulatory context should entail, or have a more constraining take on the 
regulations to be established. Although we label certain regulators’ responses to entrepre-
neurial activities as constraining, rule makers were generally open to input from industry 
stakeholders (‘EMPOWER Stakeholders’ as demanded by ICAO; presentation at High 
Level Conference on Drones in Warsaw, 2016). Whereas regulations can be constraining, 
the regulatory process is highly collaborative, as illustrated in the previous section.
In what follows, we outline the way in which interactions play out when entrepreneurs 
and regulators are faced with the joint task of  creating an effective regulatory context 
(Table IV presents an overview of  these interactions), and illustrate how they shape cer-
tain phases in the process of  proto-institutional emergence (Figure 1 provides a visual il-
lustration of  the model). Additionally, we highlight which proto-institutions had emerged 
at the point where the institutional frictions endemic to those proto-institutions sounded 
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in a transitional moment proceeding from one evolutionary phase into the next. We also 
document the nature of  these institutional frictions themselves (see Table V).
Phase 1 (2000–04): Recognizing Future Potential. Before 2000, only limited activities were 
connected to RPAS. From the turn of  the millennium onwards, however, several relevant 
events took place on a European scale, such as the foundation of  the first European 
industry association for RPAS in 2000 (UVS International), and the organization of  a first 
EU-funded awareness-raising workshop in 2001. In 2002, the establishment of  the 
European Aviation Safety Agency, EASA, followed. In the same year, the European 
Commission recognized and mentioned RPAS for the first in the general strategic 
aerospace policy framework, and a taskforce was formed between the Joint Aviation 
Authorities (JAA) and European Organisation for the Safety of  Air Navigation 
(EUROCONTROL). EASA officially became operational in 2003, taking up its mandate 
for RPAS certification in Europe, initially for systems of  more than 150 kg. In an attempt 
to develop an early concept of  RPAS regulation, the JAA/EUROCONTROL task force 
published their final report in 2004.
Typical for this period is a type of  entrepreneur–regulator interaction in which regu-
lators seek to enforce compliance from entrepreneurs, while the latter see the regulatory 
environment as mostly enabling (Playing by the Increasingly Clearer Rules). This interaction 
creates a regulatory context in which regulators seek to set certain baseline rules, which 
are affirmed by entrepreneurs by adjusting their behaviour to these rules. When reflect-
ing on the circumstances in which RPAS businesses operate, we found a number of  en-
trepreneurs who recognized that the rules in place apply to their businesses. According 
to Respondent 14, who worked for the Dutch police before starting his own firm, fol-
lowing the rules means that ‘you have to read [current rules] carefully and comply with 
them. It’s really as simple as that’. To the extent that regulations stemming from general 
aviation laws are already in place during this early phase of  Recognizing Future Potential, 
Figure 1. Entrepreneur–regulator interactions
Phase 1 (2000-2004) 
Recognizing Future Potential
Phase 2 (2005-2010)
Regulatory Bricolage
Phase 3 (2011-2015)
Focused Efforts
Phase 4 (2016-2018)
Working Towards Harmonization
As of June 2018: 
EU adopts first 
ever EU-wide 
rules for civil 
drones of all sizes
TIME
PROTO-INSTITUTIONAL
EMERGENCE
Pre-2000: 
early 
activities, 
no relevant 
events
Playing by the Increasingly Clearer Rules
Changes in Regulation Needed
Why Care about the Rules?
Better RegulationWorking on 
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entrepreneurs with a background in manned aviation seemed to profit from their in-
depth knowledge in this area, allowing them to interpret these rules as enabling struc-
tures. Respondent 13, with a background in manned aviation, remembered that ‘in the 
beginning, I had to read a lot to get an understanding about how it all works. For me it’s 
easy, because 90 per cent of  it is a copy of  manned aviation [law]. That’s what I know 
already’.
In contrast to the belief  that current rules apply to their company, another group of  
entrepreneurs operates on the belief  that rules do not apply to them, which evoked a 
more restrictive regulatory response (Why Care about the Rules?). This interaction is built on 
a disregard of  the given regulatory context, causing regulators to create new and more 
restrictive rules to constrain entrepreneurs portraying a careless attitude to extant regula-
tory frameworks. Some entrepreneurs knowingly disregarded the rules in place, especially 
during the early stages of  the Recognizing Future Potential phase, when flying RPAS was not 
as common as in later phases, and when the consequences for non-compliance were usu-
ally limited. Effective policing was not in place at that time and it was often unclear what 
constituted illegal activities (personal communication). Especially entrepreneurs who are 
part of  the RPAS industry, but do not operate unmanned aircraft themselves (e.g., they 
offer consultancy and related products/services), felt that rules do not apply to them and 
can thus safely be disregarded. As Respondent 1 put it, ‘my company is purely doing 
consultancy work. And interim project leadership for different kind of  projects. I do not 
fly [a drone] myself ’. These entrepreneurs are indifferent to many rules, as they do not 
directly facilitate or constrain their entrepreneurial activities. However, while rules do 
not apply to them directly, this does not mean that these entrepreneurs remain totally 
unaffected by regulations. Respondent 4 developed a mobile application that makes it 
possible for RPAS operators to register their upcoming flights, to see who is flying at a 
certain location, and to check whether they are currently operating in a no-fly zone. For 
that reason, he believed that the current rules do not apply to his firm and would not 
affect him greatly: ‘It is just the way that it will be and I will adjust my app [mobile phone 
application] accordingly’. This group of  entrepreneurs does not receive much attention 
from rule-makers, and does not necessarily seek to interact with them.
In sum, in this first phase the EU and related parties recognized that RPAS were an 
upcoming phenomenon in civil markets. Previously unconcerned governmental bodies 
and industry initiatives became aware of  RPAS’ implications for general aviation oper-
ations. While entrepreneurs showed both rule following and rule avoiding behaviour, 
regulators enforced compliance through rule proliferation and reinforcement. However, 
all actors increasingly experienced the institutional frictions stemming from lacking 
future-oriented regulatory actions, which contributed to the transition to the second 
phase.
Phase 2 (2005–10): Regulatory Bricolage. RPAS activities were brought to international 
attention in 2005, when the Air Navigation Commission of  ICAO requested their 
discussion. This was followed the next year with ICAO’s first exploratory meeting on 
the issue and a second meeting in 2007 that led to the establishment of  a dedicated 
study group (UASSG) to look into the development of  regulatory frameworks. UASSG 
became operational in 2008 and during the same year, JARUS was also put in place 
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with the same objective. On European scale, a number of  advisory documents were 
published in this phase. A consortium formed by UAVnet (Civilian UAV Thematic 
Network), CAPECON (Civil UAV Applications and Economic Effectivity of  Potential 
Configuration Solutions) and USICO (UAV Safety Issues for Civil Operations) proposed 
a strategic agenda and action plan in 2005, while EASA proposed a RPAS certification 
policy. Two years later, the Agency published a response document covering 270 pages 
of  comments and detailed responses to the earlier proposed certification policy draft. In 
2008, the European Commission issued their first study analysing current RPAS activities 
and detailing their future vision of  the field. The same year, the European Parliament 
and the Council of  the European Union decided to grant EASA more competency in 
aviation rule-making (often referred to as Basic Regulation), which was followed by the 
publication of  general RPAS type certification principles in 2009. Also, a number of  
new consortia and working groups emerged EU-wide, such as the EUROCAE working 
group on RPAS to develop certification and standards in 2006. The following year, 
SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research) Joint Undertaking was formed to provide 
guidance to the European air traffic management system concerning RPAS integration 
issues. Also in 2007, the INOUI (INnovative Operational UAV Integration) Consortium 
was formed to focus on the integration of  RPAS into airspace more generally, which 
was followed by the publication of  the consortium’s final report in 2010. Next to the 
working groups and reports, personal exchanges were facilitated through the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Mobility Transport’s first hearing on RPAS in 
2009, while the European Commission organized a RPAS conference together with the 
European Defence Agency in 2010. In the Netherlands, the first rules for model airplanes 
were published in 2005, aimed at regulating small unmanned aircraft with a weight of  
less than 25 kg. This was the first step taken by the Netherlands to regulate behaviours 
concerning RPAS.
With the number of  initiatives on the increase and with additional rule-making at-
tempts underway, another distinct entrepreneur–regulator interaction type emerged, 
with entrepreneurs acknowledging the existence and applicability of  rules and regula-
tions, but also perceiving these as being restrictive. To promote industry development, 
regulators responded by trying to make rules and regulations more facilitative (Working on 
Better Regulation). Specifically, regulators consulted with entrepreneurs to identify which 
rules worked and to eliminate the ones that did not, such as the ones perceived by entre-
preneurs as unnecessarily restrictive. Both parties were thus working in concert to create 
better regulations. Respondent 17 runs a company that uses RPAS for aerial filming 
and photographing. He felt that ‘the rules are not even that clear, there are a number 
of  them that are enormously binding and restricting’. Others agreed that the regulation 
‘is very unclear at the moment in the Netherlands and it is also [the country] where you 
are allowed the least in the commercial setting’ (Respondent 27). These sentiments were 
widespread in this phase of  Regulatory Bricolage, when the first RPAS-specific rules were 
published. When rule makers found that there was a large group of  stakeholders who 
believed the current situation to be untenable, they showed their willingness to continue 
with a sub-set of  rules and regulations that were more practical to use. While ‘legislation 
is a prerequisite that can be quite restrictive’, rule makers realized that ‘it also offers 
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opportunities, so that with a collaboration between the government and the industry you 
have to see how at one point we can get innovation off  the ground’ (Respondent 24).
While entrepreneurs continued to adhere to rules that they perceived as applicable 
to their businesses (Playing by the Increasingly Clearer Rules), rules still had to be made more 
accessible, especially during the early phase of  Regulatory Bricolage when little was com-
municated in a tailored way to the general public. This required a mutual willingness to 
invest extra effort into understanding the current situation, reading through legislative 
texts and/or getting involved with other industry stakeholders and regulatory institu-
tions. However, this group of  entrepreneurs also saw the extant rules as enabling, making 
it possible for their businesses to sustain and enhance their operations. The owner of  an 
aerial inspection company elucidated this point:
To us, regulation is a fact. We have to deal with it. We have very limited influence on it. We may be 
able to change a few things about the conditions in the Netherlands, but we don’t have any influence 
at all on what’s happening in England or Germany. (…) Many people say: the regulations need to be 
better. But it’s all very clear. Those rules are still as clear as they can be. (…) This week I was asked 
to sign a petition against the new regulations. I replied: no, because I am pleased with the new rules, 
which really annoyed some people. (Respondent 12)
We also observed ongoing interactions between rule-disregarding entrepreneurs and 
constraining regulators in this phase (Why Care about the Rules?). Reflecting on the state in 
the Netherlands, Respondent 19 (who also manufactures his own RPAS) remained con-
vinced that ‘if  you want to create an operational [RPAS] system here, you will need to do 
things that are not allowed’. Respondent 22 agreed with this perspective and stated that 
after the first regulations came into place in the Netherlands, he continued to operate 
‘illegally’ to be able to keep his air photography business alive:
… legislation changed in such a way that nothing was allowed anymore and then I just carried on. 
I can’t just apply for unemployment benefits like: ‘yes, I am not allowed to fly anymore’, so you just 
continue. I mean, I have no alternative.
Regulators responded to this kind of  behaviour by seeking to constrain it. They aimed 
to prevent illegal activities and stressed, as one Dutch rule-maker clearly stated, ‘law en-
forcement on illegal operations’ (presentation at European Civil RPAS Policy, Regulatory 
and Innovation Forum, Brussels, 2017). Regulators also needed to create rules to reduce 
grey areas. For example, additional rules were created that needed to be ‘efficient [for the 
police] to control the use of  drones’, as a member of  the European Commission claimed 
(presentation at EUROCAE Workshop in Brussels, 2016). As the police became better 
educated on the use of  drones and the accompanying regulations, they were able to spot 
illegal behaviour more easily and to fine the perpetrators. Nonetheless, this did not pre-
vent all entrepreneurs from engaging in illegal activity. Respondent 23, an entrepreneur 
in the film and photography sector, made it clear that ‘if  the penalty is only 350 Euro, 
I will take the risk of  being fined; I’m still making the shot. Because if  I get ten shots 
and they only get me one time, well, so what?’. Thus, for some, the risk of  being caught 
and fined seemed out of  balance in relation to the disproportionate potential upside of  
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continuing to carry out illegal flights. Based on these ‘rather negative’ (Respondent 16) 
experiences, regulators learned and created additional rules in an effort to prevent illegal 
activities from taking place.
Towards the end of  this phase, it became obvious that there were many entrepreneurs 
who believed that their company did not need to adhere to current regulations, because 
their firm represented an exception or special case that needed to be dealt with sepa-
rately. Regulators met this demand with a collaborative approach, as they understood 
that exceptions were necessary for some cases in which refinement was needed (Changes 
in Regulation Needed). This type of  interaction was built on the acknowledgement that there 
were exceptions that went beyond the given regulatory context, for which regulators 
needed to redefine rules to facilitate entrepreneurial actions that could not be executed 
in adherence to current regulations. Thus, changes in regulations were needed for certain 
RPAS uses.
In sum, during this second phase RPAS activities occurred on both the international 
and Dutch scenes, and regulatory development at the EU level intensified. Attempts 
were made on all levels to propose policy guidance frameworks while entrepreneurial 
initiatives continued to grow. However, all of  these efforts seemed uncoordinated, and 
although parties did acknowledge the work of  others, arriving at common frameworks 
proved to be cumbersome. Many parties drew on different pieces of  information and 
produced a range of  proposals and frameworks. While interactions between entrepre-
neurs and regulators were frequent, all parties involved experienced the institutional 
friction of  not yet having consolidated the plethora of  disconnected regulations, which 
sounded in the transition to the next phase.
Phase 3 (2011–15): Focused Efforts. In 2011, ICAO published a formal report on RPAS 
that became an important reference document for international RPAS regulatory 
developments. Then, in 2014, ICAO replaced the RPAS working group UASSG with a 
panel that was given the task to explicitly focus on supporting the regulatory process. One 
year later, ICAO published a RPAS Manual including more technical details on airspace 
integration and management. Supporting these international efforts, also in 2015, the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) set up a subcommittee aimed at 
developing standards around RPAS. In its efforts to consider not only the national rule-
making authorities, but also industry stakeholders, JARUS launched its Stakeholders 
Consultation Body in the same year to solicit feedback from the RPAS field as a whole. 
The European Commission organized a series of  five workshops in 2011 to grasp what 
the challenges in the development of  the European RPAS industry were. In 2012, the 
European Commission published a strategy document and created the European RPAS 
Steering group with the goal of  drawing up a roadmap for RPAS integration by 2016, 
which was published the next year. Next to its existing RPAS working group, EUROCAE 
formed an additional working group in 2012, which only focused on smaller/lighter 
RPAS. The Unmanned Aerial Systems in European Airspace (ULTRA) consortium 
formed in the same year and presented their final report in 2013. Others also continued 
their work: EASA proposed an alignment of  the European Common Rules of  the Air in 
2012, published a concept of  operations for RPAS in 2015, along with a policy initiative 
to update its Basic Regulation of  2008. EASA also introduced a regulatory framework 
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for RPAS operations the same year, and followed up with concrete proposals by the end 
of  2015. This regulatory framework mentioned three categories in which RPAS might be 
regulated in the future, based on their risk. In order to clearly map European regulatory 
developments, the DroneRules project was established in 2015. With a website as its 
main outlet, current rules of  each EU country were made publicly accessible to foster 
awareness, clarity, and understanding. Another important European event of  2015 was 
the Riga Declaration, which was the result of  an RPAS conference. The document 
talked about five principles on which the EU would focus its future efforts to stimulate the 
development of  the RPAS industry. A half  year later, the European Parliament published 
a report supporting the removal of  the existing 150 kg limit for EU-wide regulations. 
By the end of  2015, the European Commission adopted a new, comprehensive strategy 
for the European aviation sector. In the Netherlands, the Dutch industry association for 
RPAS was founded in 2012. The previously issued rules for model airplanes were revised 
in 2013 to distinguish between leisure use and professional use. They also included the 
general prohibition to use unmanned aircraft up to 150 kg, but with the possibility to 
apply for an exemption when flying RPAS for commercial use. In 2015, rules for model 
airplanes were revised again with the publication of  the first set of  rules for commercial 
RPAS. Although commercial operators were not required to apply for an exemption 
anymore, other certificates were needed. In 2014, the Dutch Ministry of  Justice and 
Security drew up an action plan for RPAS regulation. In the same year, the first lawsuit 
involving RPAS occurred as a Dutch journalist was fined for using his RPAS too close to 
an airport without permission. The Dutch Ministries of  Safety and Justice, Infrastructure 
and Environment, and Economic Affairs collectively organized a conference in 2015 
and issued a report expressing their views on RPAS afterwards. This was followed by 
a general consultation in the Dutch House of  Representatives, which discussed RPAS-
related issues.
During this phase, disregarding entrepreneurial behaviour that was met with con-
straining regulatory responses (Why Care about the Rules?) slowly phased out. Especially in 
the Netherlands, the lawsuit against the journalist who flew his RPAS without permission 
during the phase of  Focused Efforts represented a milestone in this regard. Ultimately, 
regulators sought to find ‘a good balance’, as ‘you will always have drone operators that 
fly illegally’ (Respondent 25). As the regulatory context was still in its infancy, the first set 
of  regulations was created to ‘allow people to start flying drones’ (Respondent 24) and 
rule-makers were aware that they would subsequently need to add more rules. A Dutch 
rule maker who was involved in this process recalled that, after the initial publication of  
new regulations, ‘we immediately published a future plan, immediately after the regula-
tions: this is where we want to go, that’s what we refer to as our policy intentions’.
Entrepreneurs who valued existing regulatory frameworks continued to interact with 
the regulators seeking to enforce them (Playing by the Increasingly Clearer Rules). Interestingly, 
some entrepreneurs even expressed that their customers asked more of  them in terms 
of  safe and secure operations than what current rules demanded at that point in time 
(personal communication). In such cases, entrepreneurs spoke of  ‘[s]mart customers [d]
emanding much more than regulation requires’ (presentation at AUVSI’s Unmanned 
Systems Europe in Brussels, 2015). Thus, in addition to complying with regulations, the 
market itself  occasionally required more from some RPAS firms.
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During this phase regulatory frameworks were frequently refined, and co-creation ac-
tivities between entrepreneurs and regulators continued. Rule selection processes were 
initiated when entrepreneurs felt constrained in their development of  new business mod-
els (Working on Better Regulation). According to one entrepreneur: ‘legislation has quite been 
a problem, quite often you couldn’t do things, you weren’t allowed to do things or a new 
law was being put in place’ (Respondent 6). New RPAS applications often did not fit 
extant regulatory frameworks, testifying to the fact that ‘[t]echnology has always pre-
ceded regulation’ (presentation at ICAO’s First Global RPAS Symposium in Montreal, 
2015). While the industry was still forming and proto-institutions were still in flux, reg-
ulations were subject to virtually continuous change. So much so even that Respondent 
8 expressed his concern that ‘at a certain moment, there will be more and more rules, 
and more…’. There was a desire for the government to ‘talk more openly with industry 
players, like us, to introduce legislation that is more structured and not make all sorts of  
sudden changes’ (Respondent 6).
During this phase, many entrepreneurs requested to be treated as an exception to the 
rules, as many new business models did not fit the extant regulation (Changes in Regulation 
Needed). Especially when entrepreneurs were able to demonstrate that their operations were 
safe, regulators showed their willingness to refine existing rules to permit useful RPAS ap-
plications. As a Dutch policymaker stated: ‘Of  course we also try to look ahead. And it’s 
important that you do so together. Otherwise, we won’t get there!’ (Respondent 24). For ex-
ample, Respondent 9 founded a company aiming to operate RPAS at airports for the pur-
pose of  pest control, as many airports face challenges with birds damaging aircrafts when 
aircrafts and birds collide. The issue here was that airports are no-fly zones for RPAS, while 
they would obviously benefit from the entrepreneur being exempted from the rules. This 
entrepreneur realized that the application of  RPAS that he envisioned ‘is so specific that we 
need to keep on talking [with regulatory bodies]’ to arrive at a workable solution. Such solu-
tions should not make compromises with regard to safety, but they should also enable useful 
innovations. Many productive interactions between entrepreneurs and regulators were ob-
served during this phase of  Focused Efforts, during which Dutch rule-making activities inten-
sified. Respondent 16, who worked at a governmental institution, stated that ‘if  you want to 
do something that deviates from the rules, that’s always possible if  you can show that you’ll 
be able to do it in a safe manner’. In general, this group of  entrepreneurs was aware that 
their input into the refinement of  rules was essential for creating a future context that would 
be workable for them. Respondent 2, a producer of  RPAS, stated that ‘[w]e have good con-
tact with those who make the laws and regulations, and we are all on the same page. They 
also know that they need to change it to make sure that we can fly’. He continued to stress 
that ‘a good dialogue with the authorities is very important’. When presenting our findings 
on the types of  entrepreneur–regulator interactions at an industry conference, we received 
feedback from an entrepreneur telling us that he was ‘exactly that special case’ we had just 
talked about (personal communication). In response, during his presentation, he asked rule 
makers to put more effort into allowing operations for the greater good of  society (as his 
firm uses RPAS to deliver humanitarian aid and disaster relief).
In sum, during this third phase even more regulatory activities accumulated in a short 
time span. Attempts were made to bundle efforts and focus on achieving the common 
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goal – rule-making for a safe and secure integration of  RPAS into the Dutch economy 
and into Dutch airspace – together. This resulted in collective standardization efforts, 
with recommended practices, guidance material, suggested standards and certification 
structures emerging in which rule-making bodies acknowledged and referenced each 
other’s work. While interactions involving disregarding entrepreneurs who evoked rule 
proliferation by regulators became less prevalent, all other interaction types were still 
present during this phase. But even though the efforts of  all actors became more focused 
on creating a common policy framework, they still experienced the institutional friction 
of  not yet having established collectively binding rules, which greatly contributed to the 
transition to the next phase.
Phase 4 (2016–18): Working Towards Harmonization. Internationally, the last phase was less 
eventful as European developments seemed to come to a common conclusion. ICAO 
published a preliminary concept of  operation for RPAS in 2017 and the OECD released 
a report in which RPAS were discussed as part of  the transportation mix for the first 
time. In the EU, SESAR Joint Undertaking published two studies in 2016: one on RPAS 
demonstration projects and one on the economic potential of  RPAS for Europe. Also, 
EUROCAE merged its two separate working groups together to develop standards for all 
types of  RPAS. The European UAS Standards Coordination Group (EUSCG) was formed 
in 2017 to work on RPAS standardization activities. The same year, EUROCONTROL 
published a concept of  operation for integrating RPAS into air traffic management and 
the Airports Council International (ACI) followed a year later with a position paper on 
this issue. In 2018, SESAR Joint Undertaking published a roadmap for RPAS integration 
also considering issues concerning air traffic management. The year concluded with the 
Helsinki Declaration, which included a plea for light rules and simple regulation and was 
published as a result of  yet another European RPAS conference. EASA further refined 
the proposed categories for RPAS in 2017 and published its proposed regulations in 
early 2018, before the EU adopted the new Basic Regulation for aviation in the summer 
of  2018. As of  that point, EASA was granted the mandate for rule-making regarding 
RPAS of  all kinds, regardless of  their weight. With the publication of  a regulation aimed 
at RPAS of  no more than 4 kg, the Netherlands made their last attempted in 2016 to 
introduce interim regulations, while the foreshadowing of  EU-wide rules was already 
clear. In 2018, the Dutch House of  Representatives organized a hearing and discussion 
session in which the Ministry of  Infrastructure and Water Management sought more 
insights into the use of  RPAS, their opportunities and challenges.
While some rules continued to constrain entrepreneurs in exploiting opportunities, 
regulators were still willing to facilitate entrepreneurship through rule selection (Working 
on Better Regulation). For example, with the introduction of  new regulations covering RPAS 
up to 4 kg during the phase of  Working Towards Harmonization, in July 2016 a conscious de-
cision was made to reduce the administrative burden for entrepreneurs. Whereas certain 
new rules came into effect, less useful ones were suspended. One example is ‘abolishing 
the obligation to report to the mayor’ (Respondent 24) when RPAS flights are executed. 
Also, RPAS operators were no longer required to have an operations handbook or a 
medical certificate, nor did they need to file a NOTAM, which is a notice about the up-
coming flight with relevant information (Staatscourant, 2016). Respondent 25, a Dutch 
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policymaker, explained that this was the case because ‘we wanted to look much more at 
the positive side. So, there was a real impetus to work, in particular, on being more stimu-
lating’. Upon realizing that certain rules were seen as constraining, regulators responded 
with facilitation in the form of  selective rule suspension. This type of  interaction slowly 
began to phase out when actors realized that the RPAS industry would soon be covered 
by EU-wide regulation, trumping national legislation. ‘The EASA proposed to regu-
late all drones at the EU level’ (presentation at the 3rd International Unmanned Cargo 
Aircraft Conference in Enschede, 2016), which was set in motion in 2012 (presentation 
at RPAS CivOps in Brussels, 2016). This meant that a number of  Dutch national rules 
were to disappear. All EU member states and industries were invited to deliver insights 
for ‘best practices in the field of  civil aviation [to be adopted] based on best available 
evidence and analysis’ (presentation at RPAS CivOps in Brussels, 2016).
Eventually, Playing by the Increasingly Clearer Rules became the dominant type of  inter-
action between entrepreneurs and regulators. For instance, a Dutch representative and 
member of  the European Commission, stated that ‘enforcement of  legislation is essen-
tial for the successful integration of  drones into European airspace’ (video shown at the 
RPAS CivOps in Brussels, 2016). To achieve this, EASA called for ‘compatible standards 
to support enforcement’ (presentation at EASA Workshop on Drones in Cologne, 2016). 
But such standards require a joint effort, in which ‘gradual implementation of  legislation 
and technology standards [go] along with the real needs of  the industry’ (presentation at 
the High Level Conference on Drones in Warsaw, 2016). In general, regulators expressed 
contentment with entrepreneurs and other industry parties that adhered to the current 
rules (personal communication). Rule reinforcement mostly acquired a confirmatory 
function, as commonly accepted regulations continued to exist. This became increas-
ingly important as the process of  proto-institutional emergence moved along to reach the 
end of  the Working Towards Harmonization phase. The regulators’ response was constrain-
ing, in that rules that were seen as workable by both parties gradually set the boundaries 
for future operations. However, in the event that entrepreneurs do not follow rules, ‘we 
have enforcers, we have the police and the Inspectorate and both have the responsibility 
to reinforce [the rules]’, as a Dutch rule maker put it (Respondent 24).
In a similar vein, regulators continued to assume a facilitating role in responding to 
situations in which current regulations did not accommodate special cases. Further rule 
refinement was needed, as the ‘widened range of  operations requires more regulatory 
flexibility to keep rules proportionate’, as a member of  the European Commission clearly 
articulated (presentation at EUROCAE Workshop in Brussels, 2016). In this emerging 
industry, ‘one size does not fit all’ (presentation at High Level Conference on Drones in 
Warsaw, 2016). As such, Respondent 21, an employee of  an intergovernmental organi-
zation with an advisory function, concluded:
Current rules may be fine for 99% of  the existing firms in the industry, but nevertheless, there is still 
the 1 per cent that is doing good work, but doesn’t fit within regulations. In that case, governments 
should make exceptions, for example, flying at airports. Many won’t be allowed and won’t need to fly 
there, but, for example, for cargo purposes it may be necessary.
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In summary, in this fourth phase, national and international stakeholders both under-
stood that the common European framework for RPAS rule-making was almost in place. 
Workshops and meetings were mostly organized with the intent to inform, not to regu-
late. Publications by stakeholder groups during that time focused on issues beyond the 
regulatory process, such as technology, infrastructure, or standards. All actors worked 
on arriving at a common agreement on how RPAS were to be understood, how they 
should be dealt with systematically, and how this should be reinforced appropriately and 
in a unified manner. The ending point of  our analysis marks June 2018, when the EU 
adopted a common European regulation for all civil RPAS, regardless of  their size or 
weight. This is an appropriate point in time, from which on the RPAS industry in the 
Netherlands is covered by EU-wide rules.
DISCUSSION
Dialectic Institutional Work
Much of  what we know about how institutions are created is derived from studies 
carried out in relatively mature settings, the findings of  which may not apply to the 
New Normal business landscape. Specifically, the logic of  compliance, according to 
which entrepreneurs are seen as institutionalized actors (somewhat devoid of  agency) 
in hierarchically regulated fields, does not apply in emerging fields in which the implica-
tions of  novel technologies are still imperfectly understood and in which institutionalized 
yardsticks for establishing legitimacy have not yet emerged. While more recent work has 
recognized the importance of  institutional entrepreneurs in the creation or disruption of  
institutions, this work often lacks a fine-grained interactional understanding, portraying 
entrepreneurs as heroic individuals who act in opposition to other stakeholders. What we 
need instead is a more interactive and dialectic vision, in which entrepreneurs are seen 
as the co-creators of  their institutional surroundings and in which regulators develop 
legal frameworks in consultation with pioneering entrepreneurs. The resulting proto- 
institutions, by their very nature, are instable, but adaptive. Across the various stages of  
their emergence, institutional frictions tend to mount time and again, which eventually 
result in transitional moments that cause this evolutionary process to pivot and change 
course (Padgett and Powell, 2012; Schneiberg, 2006). The effort to engage in evolution-
ary adaptations is frequently observed in fields prone to technology-enabled entrepre-
neurship, where actors with vested interests have incentives to change the trajectory of  
proto-institutional emergence, without having the incentive to abandon them altogether. 
The process of  proto-institutional emergence that can be observed in the New Normal 
business landscape thus closely follows a dialectic approach8  in which entrepreneurs and 
regulators work together in shaping the institutions of  the future. Thus, both parties en-
gage in dialectic institutional work.9 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, pp. 221–222) provide insights into institutional cre-
ation work and identify practices that focus on rules, namely advocacy work, i.e., ‘the 
mobilization of  political and regulatory support’, defining work, i.e., ‘construction of  
rule systems that confer status or identity, define boundaries of  membership or create 
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status hierarchies’ and vesting work, i.e., ‘the creation of  rule structures that confer prop-
erty rights’. These activities are important to proto-institutional emergence, since there 
is ‘far greater potential for rules-based work to lead to the de novo construction of  new 
institutions’ (p. 228, emphasis in original). We find that this is also applicable to proto- 
institutional emergence in the New Normal business landscape, as entrepreneurial action 
often precedes regulatory response. New entrepreneurial initiatives cannot be fitted into 
existing regulatory frameworks by mere extension of  earlier frameworks, such as the 
body of  regulations and conduct established in manned aviation. In the early beginnings 
of  institutions, we especially observe advocacy work. Subsequently, proto-institutions 
evolve processually, driven by dialectic institutional work between two (or more) actors 
that contribute to their emergence. The novelty value of  our work lies, in part, in shifting 
the focus from the myth of  the heroic institutional entrepreneur towards a consideration 
of  how multifaceted collectives of  actors jointly contribute to institutional change or 
emergence. This leads us to discuss the three interconnected contributions our study 
makes to the literatures on institutional work and proto-institutional emergence, and to 
understanding the New Normal.
Contributions
Institutional work. Lawrence et al. (2011, p. 55) highlight that the ‘concept of  institutional 
work insists on the need to consider the permanent recursive and dialectical interaction 
between agency and institutions’ and existing studies in institutional work examined the 
relationship between agency and structure (Battilana and D’Aunno, 2009; Canning and 
O’Dwyer, 2016). However, the micro-foundational processes by which actors come to 
shape structure are at the same time the product of  interaction between these very actors. 
This has been largely overlooked by scholars focusing on institutional work processes. By 
introducing dialectic institutional work, we aim to shift the focus towards the interactions 
occurring between actors while engaging in the creation of  new institutions. Thus, we 
take the discussion in the institutional work literature one step further by not only shifting 
the ‘gaze away from the “organizational field” and large-scale social transformations, 
and attend more closely to the relationship between institutions and the actors who 
populate them’ (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 57), but also to the relationship between these 
actors themselves. Interestingly, Ozcan and Gurses (2018, p. 1793) point out that existing 
‘institutional work has largely considered state actors as indistinguishable and static, and 
focused on reinforcing existing policies for institutional maintenance purposes’. Our 
findings show, however, that the interaction dynamics involving state actors are more 
nuanced and that regulators do not form one monolithic body. We thus confirm Ozcan 
and Gurses’ (2018) findings and conclude that not only in regulatory category emergence, 
but also in proto-institutional emergence in the New Normal business landscape, our 
conceptualizations of  regulators’ behaviour demand more nuance.
To the best of  our knowledge, Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006) are the only research-
ers who attempted to introduce dialectics to the study of  institutional work. However, in 
studying the interactions between institutional actors, the authors focus on ‘change [that] 
emerges from interactions between proponents of  current institutional arrangements and 
parties espousing contradictory arrangements’ with ‘new arrangements that […] are then 
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challenged by proponents of  alternative arrangements as the dialectical process recycles’ 
(p. 122). This approach seems most suitable for institutional change, as it assumes some 
degree of  existing institutional arrangements, but profits from refinement when applied 
to institutional emergence. In settings of  proto-institutional emergence, where established 
views that need to be challenged are missing, our study provides insight into the pro-
cess of  dialectic institutional work by actors who jointly engage in the creation of  proto- 
institutions. Similarly, looking at interaction processes in building proto-institutions, Helfen 
and Sydow (2013) focus on ‘inter-organizational negotiations as a form of  institutional 
work’ (p. 1073). The authors describe negotiation work as practices through which two 
organizational actors quite intentionally resolve conflict arising from given, dissatisfactory 
institutional arrangements by developing and adhering to agreed-upon new ones. In con-
trast to these authors’ work, we document a far less structured and less orchestrated pro-
cess of  institutional (re)design, which is nonetheless bounded and stabilized by a dialectic 
dynamic. More specifically, dialectic institutional work often entails several interactions 
and multiple interaction types between involved actor groups occurring simultaneously, as 
previously shown in Figure 1. We thus provide a more nuanced view on interaction pro-
cesses as they occur when entrepreneurs and regulators engage in dialectic institutional 
work, especially in emerging contexts such as those found in the New Normal business 
landscape, where traditional concepts fall short of  explaining observed outcomes.
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, p. 249) have urged scholars that only by studying the 
emergence of  institutions using institutional work can theorists ‘avoid the subjective il-
lusion of  institutional outcomes and begin to unpack the relational and interactive mo-
ments of  institutional production’. We believe that with our study, we were able to answer 
this call, documenting the interactions in the Dutch RPAS industry that drive proto- 
institutional emergence. This brings us to the contributions we make to literature on 
proto-institutional emergence.
Proto-institutional emergence. While Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006) conceptually lay out 
institutional innovation and change as a dialectic process within established organizational 
fields, our research adds to studies of  new institutions by explicating the diverse 
entrepreneur–regulator interactions in emerging organizational fields. Importantly, in 
newly forming technology-enabled organizational fields, actors are actively involved in 
shaping proto-institutions that may or may not prevail in the future. As such, we respond 
to the call by Bruton et al. (2010, p. 434) for researchers to consider the ‘institutional-
individual mindset’ connections that impact behaviour and supply additional evidence 
of  entrepreneurial behaviour situated in its various contexts (Ucbasaran et al., 2001; 
Zahra et al., 2014). We show that entrepreneurs are not only exogenous ‘rule-takers’, 
but also influence the creation of  the context in which they operate as endogenous ‘rule-
makers’. Regulatory efforts occur in response to behaviour espoused by entrepreneurs 
who actively share their future visions of  the emerging institution with regulators, such 
that regulatory interventions do not occur in isolation in a top-down manner (Bylund 
and McCaffrey, 2017). New regulations are not unlike entrepreneurial opportunities; 
they are socially construed as regulators observe and interpret how new organizational 
fields emerge, while entrepreneurs aim to influence their regulatory behaviour. Thus, 
we contribute to research on proto-institutional emergence by offering a deeper 
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understanding of  the dynamics that underlie the activities of  different actors in an 
emerging context exemplary for the New Normal business landscape. Eventually, the 
socially constructed reality in which entrepreneurs and regulators operate emerges 
from and is redefined by their actions. Our study thus responds to the call by Douhan 
and Henrekson (2007, p. 22), who caution scholars not to be ‘restricted to analyzing 
how institutions affect the level and type of  entrepreneurial activity’, but instead to also 
‘consider how entrepreneurial activities affect institutions’. The shared construction of  
reality by all stakeholders involved in proto-institutional emergence extends beyond the 
assumption that regulators shape institutions in a one-sided manner. In our research, 
we have had the unique opportunity to trace and reveal the dialectic institutional work 
shaping future institutions in real time, during the adaptively unstable and pivot-prone 
proto-institutional emergence stage.
Understanding the New Normal. Finally, our study contributes to a better understanding of  
the New Normal business landscape. While Hitt and colleagues (1998) have previously 
drawn attention to the emergence of  a ‘new competitive landscape’ which became 
apparent at the end of  the 1990s, we currently face a turbulent world typified by more 
rapid (and wider) economic, political, and technological change. Existing research in 
strategy, innovation and entrepreneurship focuses on the implications that these New 
Normal conditions have for consumers (Etzioni, 2011), firms (Hitt et al., 2016) and 
society at large (El-Erian, 2010), but we also need to better understand how actions 
at the micro-level shape the New Normal business landscape at the macro-level and 
vice versa. Entrepreneurs and regulators, in particular, are becoming increasingly 
interdependent in the New Normal business landscape for several reasons (see Abels, 
2014; Benton, 2013; Davis, 2009; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; El-Erian, 2010; Martin 
et al., 2012). First, because economic growth from existing businesses has stagnated in 
many fields, regulators are becoming increasingly anxious to promote and sustain high-
growth entrepreneurial ventures. Second, recent policies of  economic isolationism and 
protectionism have resulted in stagnating international trade and FDI flows, pushing 
entrepreneurs and regulators alike to strengthen domestic competitiveness and focus on 
national markets. Third, public pressure on governments to regulate newly emerging fields 
is on the increase, urging them to reach out to entrepreneurs to reduce knowledge gaps 
and information asymmetries. Fourth, financial and capacity constraints facing federal 
and local governments (including the state level in the USA and the member state level 
in the European Union) necessitate regulatory co-creation. All of  these factors combined 
demonstrate that we need stronger theory on how entrepreneurs and regulators jointly 
co-create new regulatory frameworks in the New Normal business landscape. With our 
study, we have made an important first step in this direction, but we call upon researchers 
working in strategy, innovation and entrepreneurship to build upon our conceptualization 
of  dialectic institutional work to uncover how regulator–entrepreneur interactions can 
help facilitate successful business founding, growth and management under New Normal 
conditions.
Building on work by Verbeke (2018), we see the New Normal business landscape as 
being characterized by both radical change and high-frequency behavioural adapta-
tions. As we have shown for the Dutch RPAS industry, radical change stemming from 
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advances in RPAS technology, coupled with entrepreneurial initiatives to create new 
business models that cannot be captured by extant regulatory frameworks, drive proto- 
institutional emergence in the New Normal business landscape through dialectic in-
stitutional work. Examples of  such radical changes include the numerous new busi-
ness models that entrepreneurs have created by employing drones. These range from 
addressing grand challenges (e.g., using tethered drones to transform wind power into 
energy; employing drones for disaster relief  in difficult-to-reach areas) to innovative 
ways of  replacing human workers in dangerous, high-risk environments (e.g., inspection 
of  oil flares and gas towers; employment in the mining industry to inspect hazardous 
sites). High-frequency behavioural changes also occur during this process, because both 
entrepreneurs and regulators interact in different ways and adapt their responses ac-
cordingly. For instance, high frequency behavioural changes can be found in the form 
of  the numerous new rules, standards, certifications, and practices that have emerged 
during the relatively short period of  time in which we studied the RPAS industry. In the 
period from 2011 to 2015 alone (Phase 3), we counted 28 impactful events occurring in 
regulatory space.
We also have uncovered and explicated several cascading effects – multilevel institutional 
change patterns in an organizational field in which change at a higher level of  aggregation 
or in higher order systems initiates changes at a lower level (or vice versa) – within the 
New Normal business landscape (Verbeke, 2018). These effects are bidirectional; as entre-
preneurs’ beliefs concerning future institutions shape their behaviour in interacting with 
regulators, the outcome is field-level emergence of  proto-institutions. Such effects, cascad-
ing from the micro-level to the macro-level, can be observed when dialectic institutional 
work provides the impetus for proto-institutional emergence. On the other hand, we have 
also uncovered cascading effects trickling down from the macro-level to the micro-level in 
building regulatory frameworks. Policy makers and entrepreneurs operating at the national 
level in the Netherlands eventually needed to adhere and accommodate to rules stemming 
from the EU. Therefore, we add to the discussion on cascading effects in the New Normal 
business landscape that these can be two-sided. Some effects are driven by overarching 
macro-developments trickling down to the individual level, whereas others originate at the 
micro-level but end up influencing industry-wide institutional emergence progresses.
We thus propose that our conceptualization of  dialectic institutional work provides 
a useful lens for understanding the dynamics of  proto-institutional emergence in the 
New Normal business landscape. In settings typified by New Normal conditions, new tech-
nologies and their applications tend to fuel new forms of  entrepreneurship (Christensen 
et al., 2019). Furthermore, these new entrepreneurial initiatives demand novel regula-
tory institutions, because the Schumpeterian ‘new combinations’ of  which they consist 
rarely fit existing frameworks (Schumpeter, 1934). Finally, due to the mounting financial 
and capacity constraints weighing on national and local governments, these regulatory 
institutions must increasingly be developed in co-creation with entrepreneurs. In short, 
dialectic institutional work is a process commonly observed in the New Normal business 
landscape, even though specific boundary conditions will determine how precisely this 
newly documented type of  institutional work will play out in other organizational fields.
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Limitations and Future Research
As we chose a specific organizational field in which to conduct our research, boundary 
conditions apply to our study, which simultaneously resemble fruitful directions for future 
research. First, since the Dutch RPAS industry is a context in which new technologies 
fuel the development of  the field, interactions between entrepreneurs and regulators in 
less technology-driven fields may be different. For example, risks associated with sys-
tem failures and crashes weigh heavily in the RPAS context, whereas these technology- 
related challenges are not as relevant in other fields. Future research may, therefore, look 
at organizational fields that do not form around technologies, but around products and 
services instead. Second, the Dutch RPAS industry is primarily a case of  technology- 
enabled entrepreneurship rather than a case of  technological development and diffusion. 
This entails opportunities for researchers with a particular interest in the regulation of  
new technologies. We believe that a comparative conceptual exploration of  negotiation 
work (Helfen and Sydow, 2013) and dialectic institutional work would be a particularly 
interesting exercise, to assess which concept has the greatest explanatory power in such 
settings. Third, a salient feature of  our research setting is that a vast number of  stake-
holders in the RPAS industry have a background in or are familiar with manned avia-
tion. This prior knowledge and familiarization with practices, conventions and codes in 
the manned aviation field may have impacted these actors’ approach to interacting in 
the newly emerging field we studied. This offers interesting opportunities for researchers 
to more closely examine the influence of  prior knowledge of  or prior affiliation with a 
related industry on the formation of  new institutions. Fourth, an interesting question is 
whether dialectic institutional work is conducive to the development of  what Acemoglu 
and colleagues (2005, 2012) call inclusive institutions which facilitate economic growth 
(Tomizawa et al., 2019). In this analysis, which contrasts such arrangements with ex-
tractive institutions captured by political and economic elites, inclusive institutions are a 
main driver of  equality and economic development because they enfranchise the human 
capital of  otherwise disenfranchised non-elite actors (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). 
A speculative but interesting thesis to explore in the future is whether dialectic institu-
tional work, which is by definition an open process that draws on the inputs of  numerous 
entrepreneurs together with regulators, could be a process that is capable of  producing 
inclusive institutions. It would appear that the involvement of  multiple entrepreneurs 
in the process of  proto-institutional emergence would ensure the continued openness 
of  the resultant institutional structures towards future entrepreneurial initiatives as well 
as the general enfranchisement of  future generations of  entrepreneurs. Fifth, a final 
intriguing question is whether the type of  innovation matters to the process by which an 
emerging institutional context takes shape. In the case of  the Dutch RPAS industry, the 
introduction of  drones in Dutch airspace seems to have ensued a process of  sustaining 
(as opposed to disruptive) innovation, since the novel entrepreneurial opportunities open-
ing up because of  this introduction did not majorly upset any industry incumbents. A 
question for future research is whether more disruptive innovations will elicit a similarly 
accommodative response from regulators, or whether entrepreneurial disruption is more 
likely to spawn regulatory blowback. To sum up, we have illustrated interactions between 
stakeholders by means of  a model that we believe to accurately represent all that was 
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observed in the emerging field we studied. However, because the complexity of  processes 
in the social world may exceed what we were able to capture in our model, our study 
should be seen as offering a first step in the direction of  understanding proto-institutional 
emergence in the New Normal.
CONCLUSION
In this study, we asked: How do regulatory proto-institutions arise in the type of  
technology-enabled entrepreneurship-intensive and behavioural change-prone organiza-
tional fields that are emblematic for the New Normal business landscape? We addressed 
this question by offering a process-theoretical account of  how, under New Normal con-
ditions, novel regulatory institutional structures emerge from repeated, structured inter-
actions between entrepreneurs and policy makers. Two broad conclusions can be drawn 
from our account. First, under New Normal conditions, regulatory proto-institutions 
arise from dialectic institutional work involving both entrepreneurs and policy makers, 
without either of  them leading the process. The relationship between the actor groups 
involved in proto-institutional emergence processes is thus best described as being iter-
atively interdependent. Second, the proto-institutions that derive from the initial inter-
actions between entrepreneurs and policy makers are best seen as temporary solutions 
to immediate problems: they represent a sort of  regulatory ‘truce’ that is bound to be 
broken when endogenous institutional frictions create pivotal moments sounding in a 
subsequent stage of  institutional development. In our theorization, proto-institutions are 
thus explicitly not to be seen as embryonic yet inherently representative manifestations 
of  future institutions, but rather as the non-recurring evolutionary stages of  an emergent 
trajectory leading up to full-fledged institutions.
NOTES
 [1] Institutional frictions arise when institutional arrangements become increasingly inapt at remedying 
the social or economic problems for which they were once designed, causing the actors embedded in 
and dependent upon these institutions to search for alternative solutions or develop costly workarounds. 
Such frictions derive from an incoherent configuration of  elements within an institutional arrangement 
or from “duels” between competing arrangements (Yiu et al., 2014).
 [2] We thank one of  our reviewers for pointing out that salient studies on proto-industrial development 
tend to date back further than the time periods typically discussed in the proto-institutional emergence 
literature. The work by Sheilagh Ogilvie (1997) should be mentioned in this regard, as it carefully docu-
ments historical developments in the area of  institution-building and the design of  key social institutions 
in the Black Forest textile industry in the eighteenth century.
 [3] Note that we will refer to RPAS (Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems) in the remainder of  this paper. 
Others refer to UAV (Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle) or UAS (Unmanned Aircraft System) more broadly. 
Although ‘drones’ colloquially capture a wide variety of  unmanned aircraft, the term historically has a 
rather negative connotation.
 [4] It should be noted that before June 2018 in Europe, only aircraft with a weight of  more than 150 kg 
were bound to be regulated by EASA. Aircraft that are lighter were regulated by each country’s national 
aviation authorities. On top, ICAO aims to provide an international regulatory framework.
 [5] We refer to representatives of  regulatory bodies when describing individuals representing governmental 
authorities, such as national regulators, supervisory bodies, other European and Dutch legislative agen-
cies or supra-national mandated workgroups. These are decision-makers shaping, implementing and 
monitoring the regulatory context (Elert et al., 2016).
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 [6] We acknowledge that there are other users of  RPAS, e.g., non-commercial users who are flying toy 
drones in their leisure time. However, these are small-scale operations and this group of  users is not 
actively interacting with regulatory bodies, and thus not contributing significantly to shaping proto- 
institutions in the New Normal business landscape.
 [7] Due to space constraints, we decided to make an 11-page table presenting a detailed timeline of  the 
events unfolding in the Dutch, EU, and international contexts during each phase described in this study 
available as an online supplement through Figshare: doi.org/10.25397/eur.8870351.v1
 [8] We follow Zeitz (1980, p. 73) in our definition to refer to dialectics as ‘the basic logic of  social inter-
action’. Although we do not apply techniques of  dialectical analysis in our study, we propose that the 
processes we document can themselves be seen as dialectic, thereby following Benson (1977, p. 3) who 
claims that the ‘dialectical view is fundamentally committed to the concept of  process’.
 [9] We would like to thank the Special Issue editor Prof. David Ahlstrom for encouraging us to introduce 
this term, which perfectly captures our findings.
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APPENDIX 1. Interview protocols.
Topic Area Sample Questions
Entrepreneurs  
Venture founding • How did you start your business?
• What kind of  resources were important to use? How did you get them?
Interactions with 
regulators
• How important do you regard relationships with government 
institutions?
• Could you please describe the kind of  interactions you have with 
regulators?
Industry context • What does it mean to you to be an entrepreneur in the RPAS industry?
• How do you keep up with (regulatory) developments in the industry?
Regulatory developments • Are you more focused on Dutch or European rules and regulations?
• Where does the industry stand in five years concerning rules and 
regulations?
Regulators  
Work practices • How did your work change since RPAS became more popular?
• Can you describe some of  the problems you face in your work?
Interaction with 
entrepreneurs
• How does the interaction with entrepreneurs look like?
• How flexible are you in helping entrepreneurs?
Industry context • What will be more important in the future, Dutch regulations or Europe-
wide ones?
• What are your thoughts on illegal operations/flights?
Regulatory developments • What are remaining, important questions that need to be answered in the 
future?
• What do you expect will change within the next five years?
